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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. William Gray, Jr. *
Katherine E. Ramsey **
INTRODUCTION
The 2020 Virginia General Assembly1 addressed a wide variety
of matters affecting wills, trusts, and estates, ranging from a new
article of the Virginia Uniform Trust Code and an expanded partition procedure to a $2 increase in the circuit court clerk’s recordation fees. Among the most helpful were new rules that clarify
and expand the powers and responsibilities of non-trustees who
may direct the trustee on certain issues and a revised procedure
for partitioning real property while protecting the rights and interests of co-owners. The legislature also dealt with fiduciary issues, including express authorization for multiple-party bank accounts, additional duties for children’s guardians ad litem,
relationships that may disqualify a lawyer as guardian or conservator, protections against suspected financial abuse of adults, reliance on qualification certificates, and requirements for certain
fiduciaries’ accounts. The General Assembly also authorized beneficiary designations for ABLE savings accounts, allowed the substitution of a bank for a related trust company in multiple fiduciary roles, broadened disclosure rules for certain gifts to state
colleges and universities, expanded the list of documents a notary
may accept as identification, and allowed transfer on death
(“T.O.D.”) designations for motor vehicles with multiple owners.

*
Senior Counsel, Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1977,
University of Virginia; B.S.I.E., B.A., 1973, Rutgers University.
** Member, Virginia Estate & Trust Law, PLC, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1998, University of Virginia; M.S., 1988, Boston University; B.A., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University.
1. Except where specifically noted, all legislation summarized in this Article became
effective July 1, 2020.
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I. LEGISLATION
A. Uniform Directed Trust Act
When Virginia adopted the Uniform Trust Code in 2005, trust
directors were still a relatively rare tool in the practitioner’s
toolbox.2 A few years later, as the use of trust protectors became
more common, Virginia Code section 64.2-770 was amended to
clarify the trustee’s fiduciary duties when following the trust director’s direction.3 Generally speaking, the trustee was protected
from liability when following instructions only if the trust instrument expressly provided for it.4
In 2017, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Directed Trust Act, which was quickly adopted by several
states.5 With the support of the Virginia estate planning bar, the
2020 General Assembly followed suit, amending several provisions
of the Virginia Uniform Trust Code and replacing section 64.2-700
with the uniform act (Article 8.2 of Title 64.2).6
Virginia’s new Uniform Directed Trust Act (the “UDTA”) sets
forth the general powers and duties of a “trust director,” defined
as someone other than a trustee, including a settlor or beneficiary,
who has the power under the trust instrument to direct the trustee
as to the investment, management, or distribution of trust property or other matters of trust administration.7 Of course, the settlor of a revocable trust may give the trustee directions that are
contrary to the trust terms without being deemed a trust director.8
Similarly, anyone who holds a power of appointment, a power to

2. Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 935, 2005 Va. Acts 1793, 1816 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-541.06 to -551.03 (Cum. Supp. 2005), and recodified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.2-700 to -808 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
3. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 562, 2012 Va. Acts 1098, 1098 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-548.08(E) (Interim Supp. 2012), and recodified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2770(E) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
4. See id. For a more detailed discussion of VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(E), see J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and
Estates, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 346–49 (2012).
5. See UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
6. Act of Apr. 7, 2020, ch. 768, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-701, -703, -706, -752, -756, -779.26 to -779.38 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-701 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
8. See id. §§ 64.2-752(B), -779.28(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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appoint or remove a trustee or trust director, or any power that is
expressly held in a nonfiduciary capacity for federal tax purposes
is not treated as a trust director.9 A beneficiary’s right of withdrawal or to exercise any other powers that would affect his or her
beneficial interest (or the beneficial interest of another beneficiary
under the virtual representation rules) is also not considered a
power to direct the trustee.10
As under prior law, a trust director is presumptively a fiduciary,
who must act in good faith with regard to the trust’s purposes and
the beneficiaries’ interests and who is liable for any loss that results from a breach of his or her fiduciary duty.11 However, unlike
prior Virginia Code section 64.2-700, the fiduciary presumption
may be overcome only by express language in the instrument
providing that the UDTA does not apply, in which case rules similar to section 64.2-700 will govern the relationship.12 Other than
this important change, the UDTA rules are consistent with former
section 64.2-700, while they also add much-needed clarity regarding the trustee’s and trust director’s respective roles.
Under the UDTA, a direction from a trust director generally
overrides the trustee’s obligation to act in good faith and in keeping with the trust terms, as well as any fiduciary duty the trustee
may owe to the settlor or the beneficiaries.13 The trustee must follow the director’s directions unless it would involve willful misconduct on the part of the trustee.14
The UDTA also confirms that, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, most provisions of the Uniform Trust Code previously applicable only to trustees now also apply to trust directors:
(a) A trust director has the same fiduciary duty and liability in
the exercise or non-exercise of his or her powers as a similarly
situated trustee.15

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. § 64.2-779.28(A)(1)–(2), (5) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 64.2-779.28(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 64.2-779.27(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. §§ 64.2-779.27(C), -799.28(A)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 64.2-779.32(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 64.2-779.32(B)–(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. §§ 64.2-779.30 to -779.31(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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(b) The trust terms may vary a trust director’s duty or liability
to the same extent as a similarly situated trustee.16
(c) The trust director and trustee have no duty to provide
information to each other, to monitor each other’s actions, or to
advise a settlor, beneficiary, trustee, or director that they might
have acted differently.17 Doing so voluntarily in one instance does
not impose any such duty in the future.18
(d) The same limitations period applies to actions against a
trust director or a trustee for breach of trust, and the filing of a
report or accounting has the same effect on the statute of
limitations for each.19
(e) Trust directors and trustees may assert the same defenses
in actions against them for breach of trust.20
(f) The same rules apply to both trust directors and trustees as
to acceptance, giving bond, reasonable compensation, resignation,
removal, vacancy, and appointment of successors.21
The UDTA and conforming changes to the Uniform Trust Code
apply to any trust that has its principal place of administration in
Virginia and that (1) was created on or after July 1, 2020; (2) was
amended on or after that date, whether by the settlor, by a nonjudicial settlement agreement, by decanting, or by the court; or (3)
expressly incorporated the provisions of former Virginia Code section 64.2-770(E) by specific reference.22 However, in the case of
trusts described in clause (2), the UDTA applies only to decisions
or actions taken on or after the date of amendment.23
B. Multiple-Party Financial Accounts
Many practitioners can attest to the difficulties faced by multiple fiduciaries wishing to open a bank or brokerage account and

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 64.2-779.31(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.34(A)(1), (B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.34(A)(2), (B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.35 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.36 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.38 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.27(A)(1)–(4) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 64.2-779.27(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).

GRAY RAMSEY 551 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

11/30/2020 4:16 PM

209

delegate signature authority to one of their number. The institution may insist that all parties act together, or refuse to open the
account entirely, unless the authorizing instrument expressly authorizes each fiduciary to act alone. The result has often been frustration, at a minimum. Fortunately, the 2020 General Assembly
addressed the problem by expressly authorizing a bank or other
financial institution to open and deal with multiple-fiduciary accounts in the same manner as single-fiduciary accounts.24
For purposes of the statute, a “multiple-fiduciary account” is a
fiduciary account where more than one fiduciary is authorized to
act.25 A “fiduciary” includes a guardian, committee, trustee, executor, administrator, administrator c.t.a., curator under a will, conservator, agent under a power of attorney, or attorney acting under an attorney-client relationship.26 A “fiduciary account” is an
estate account, an account established by one or more agents under a power of attorney, an individual’s existing account to which
one or more agents under the individual’s power of attorney are
added, an account established by one or more conservators or committees, an account under a testamentary trust or another trust
instrument with independent significance, or an account arising
from another fiduciary relationship such as an attorney-client relationship.27
A multiple-fiduciary account may be paid upon request to, or at
the direction of, any one or more of the fiduciaries, including a successor fiduciary who is duly authorized to act.28 The payment has
no effect on the rights of the beneficiaries or the fiduciaries’ duties
under the governing instrument.29 However, the financial institution is discharged from liability when making the payment,
whether or not it is consistent with the underlying fiduciary relationship.30

24. See Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 259, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 6.2-604, -605(B), -612(B), -615.1, -616 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-604 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
26. Id.
27. Id. The term does not include an account held by one or more parties as trustee if
the trust relationship is established by the form of the account and deposit agreement and
there is no trust corpus other than the account. Id.
28. Id. § 6.2-615.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
29. See id. § 6.2-605(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
30. See id. § 6.2-616(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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C. ABLE Savings Trust Accounts
The 2020 General Assembly made two useful changes to the
rules governing ABLE savings trust accounts.31 First, the beneficiary of an ABLE account may designate a survivor who will become the beneficiary of the account when the former beneficiary
dies or, if not eligible to become a beneficiary, will then receive the
balance of the account.32 In addition, neither the account balance
nor the beneficiary’s estate is subject to clawback by the Commonwealth or its agencies for any benefits previously provided.33 However, these favorable rules may be preempted by contrary federal
law.34
D. Partition of Real Property
As real property passes from generation to generation, title often becomes vested in many individuals who are only distantly related to one another. In such circumstances, an unscrupulous
buyer may seek to acquire the property cheaply by buying one
owner’s small fractional interest and then forcing a partition sale
whereby he or she can purchase the property for less than fair
market value. This problem is particularly acute for low- to middle-income families.35 The 2020 Virginia General Assembly
amended the procedures for partitioning property to avoid this
outcome when possible.36
In any partition action filed on or after July 1, 2020, the court
must order partition in kind if practicable.37 In such cases, two or
more owners may elect to have their shares laid off together if partition can be conveniently made in that way, and the court may
require one or more owners to pay amounts to one or more other
31. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 923, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 23.1-707(G) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-707(G)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
33. See id. § 23.1-707(G)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
34. See id. § 23.1-707(G) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
35. See generally UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS PROP. ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010).
36. Act of Mar. 6, 2020, ch. 193, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-81 to -81.1, -83 to -83.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)); Act of Mar. 3, 2020, ch. 115, 2020
Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-81 to -81.1, -83 to -83.3 (Cum.
Supp. 2020)).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-81, -83(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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owners so that the total value received by each party in cash and
property will be just and proportionate to their respective fractional interests.38 Also, if the court orders partition in kind, it must
allocate a single undivided share to all owners who are unknown,
unlocatable, or the subject of a default judgment.39
Only if a partition in kind is not practicable may the court consider allotting the entire property to one or more parties who are
willing to pay a price equal to its fair market value as determined
by the court.40 If the property is to be allotted, the court will require those seeking allotment to notify all other parties that allotment is possible and of the required price.41 If more than one party
seeks allotment and they cannot come to an agreement, the court
must decide which of them will have the property after considering
a number of factors set forth in the statute, including the parties’
history with and sentimental attachment to the property.42 The
court also may order an allotment of part of the property and a
sale of the rest.43 The statute sets forth detailed procedures for
carrying out the allotment.44
The court may order a partition sale only as a last resort, if neither partition in kind nor allotment is practicable or equitable.45 It
must be an open-market sale unless the court finds that sealed
bids or an auction “would be more economically advantageous and
in the best interests of the parties as a group.”46 Sealed bids or an
auction also may be options if the open-market sale fails to produce
an offer at the court-determined property value or a reasonable
lower figure.47 The statute sets forth detailed procedures for the
conduct of the open-market sale.48
Regardless of whether the property is to be partitioned in kind,
allotted, or sold, its value must be determined. Unless all owners
agree on the value or a valuation method, the court must appoint
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. § 8.01-81 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id.
See id. § 8.01-83(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83(B), (D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 8.01-83.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id. § 8.01-83.1(B)–(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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a disinterested appraiser to value the property assuming sole ownership of a fee simple estate.49 After submitting a report to the
court, the appraiser must mail a notice of filing within three business days to all parties stating the appraised fair market value of
the property and other relevant information.50 A party then has
thirty days in which to object to the appraisal.51 Thereafter, the
court will hold a hearing to determine the fair market value of the
property, at which time it may consider any other evidence of value
offered by a party.52 The court will then enter an order determining the property’s fair market value.53
A plaintiff who wishes to serve notice of the partition action by
publication must post a conspicuous sign on the subject property
announcing the action, identifying the court and the common designation by which the property is known, and including any other
information the court may require.54
E. Reliance on Fiduciary’s Qualification Certificate
The Virginia Uniform Power of Attorney Act protects third parties who rely in good faith on an acknowledged power of attorney,
and imposes liability on those who refuse to do so.55 The 2020 General Assembly has added Virginia Code section 64.2-520.2 and
amended section 64.2-2011 to provide comparable rules for persons dealing with personal representatives of estates, guardians,
and conservators who present a currently effective certificate of

49. See id. § 8.01-81.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
50. See id. § 8.01-81.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
51. See id. § 8.01-81.1(D)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
52. See id. § 8.01-81.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
53. See id. § 8.01-81.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
54. See id. § 8.01-83.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020). The statute sets a posting deadline of “10
days after the court’s determination,” but it is not clear to which court determination this
refers. See id. Under the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (on which the Virginia
statute is largely based), the court must make an initial determination that the property
involved is “heirs property” to which the Act applies. See UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS PROP.
ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). However, the General Assembly did not limit Virginia’s partition protections to “heirs property,” so no such determination is required. Cf.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-81 (Cum. Supp. 2020). Presumably, therefore, Virginia’s ten-day
deadline will begin to run upon the commencement of the partition action.
55. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-1617, -1618 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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qualification.56 Specifically, any third party conducting business in
good faith with a personal representative, guardian, or conservator who presents a currently effective certificate of qualification
may presume that the person is properly authorized to act (except
to the extent a guardian’s or conservator’s powers may be limited
by the court’s order of appointment).57
When presented with a personal representative’s, guardian’s, or
conservator’s currently effective qualification certificate, the third
party must either accept or reject it within seven business days.58
The third party may reject the certificate only if (1) engaging in
the transaction would be illegal, (2) the person has actual
knowledge that the fiduciary’s authority or the certificate has terminated, (3) the person believes in good faith that the certificate
is invalid or that the fiduciary does not have the authority asserted, or (4) the person believes in good faith the transaction may
be financially exploitive.59 Otherwise, if the third party refuses to
accept the certificate, the fiduciary may seek a court order, in
which case the third party may be held liable for the fiduciary’s
reasonable attorney fees and costs.60
F. Report of Suspected Financial Abuse
In an effort to protect vulnerable adults from financial abuse,
Virginia Code section 63.2-1606(L) was enacted in 2019 to authorize financial institutions to delay or refuse to execute a transaction, or to refuse to disburse funds, if their staff believed in good
faith that an adult was being exploited.61 The statute was
amended this year to require the financial institution to report any

56. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 702, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2520.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020), and codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2011(D) (Cum.
Supp. 2020)).
57. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-520.2(A), -2011(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
58. See id. §§ 64.2-520.2(B), -2011(D)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
59. Id.
60. See id. §§ 64.2-520.2(A), -2011(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
61. Acts of Mar. 18, 2019, chs. 420 & 421, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606(C), (L) (Cum. Supp. 2019)). For a discussion of the
2019 legislation, see J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 183, 190–91 (2019).
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such refusal or delay within five business days to the local social
services department or adult protective services hotline.62
G. Clerk’s Fees for Lodging Wills and Recording Documents
The 2020 General Assembly approved a nominal fee increase for
clerks, raising the charge for lodging, indexing, and preserving a
will from $2 to $5.63 Similarly, the various fees a clerk may charge
for recording and indexing writings and related matters have been
increased by $2 each.64
H. Probate Tax—Virginia Beach Mass Shooting Victims
State and local probate taxes are waived for the estates of
individuals who died as a result of the Virginia Beach mass
shooting on May 31, 2019.65 If the clerk’s office has already
collected such taxes, they are to be refunded.66
I. Homestead Exemptions from Garnishment and Lien
In addition to the existing $5000 (or $10,000, if the debtor is
sixty-five or older) homestead exemption, a debtor may exempt
from creditor process up to $25,000 of real or personal property
used as the principal residence of the householder or the householder’s dependents.67 If the debtor claims this homestead exemption, the amount so claimed reduces his or her remaining available
exemption for eight years from the date of the claim.68 Previously,
the exemption, once used, was lost.69

62. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 931, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1606(L) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
63. Act of Mar. 2, 2020, ch. 68, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.1-275(A)(39), 64.2-409(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
64. Act of Mar. 2, 2020, ch. 69, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-275(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
65. Acts of Mar. 10 & 11, 2020, chs. 249 & 278, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified
at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1718.01 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
66. See id. at __, __.
67. Act of Mar. 12, 2020, ch. 328, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-512.4, 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
68. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 34-21 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-21 (Repl. Vol. 2019).

GRAY RAMSEY 551 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

11/30/2020 4:16 PM

215

J. T.O.D. Designation for Motor Vehicles
Beginning in 2013, the sole individual owner of a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer could obtain a certificate of title that designated a beneficiary to whom the vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
would pass at the owner’s death, provided there was no lien
against it.70 As of July 1, 2020, the same may be done for vehicles
owned by more than one individual, to be effective upon the death
of the last surviving owner.71
K. Acceptable Identification for Notarization
A Virginia notary public must exercise a high degree of care in
confirming the identity of the person whose signature is being notarized.72 If the notary does not know the individual personally, he
or she must ascertain the signer’s identity through satisfactory evidence as defined by Virginia Code section 47.1-2.73 This statute
has been amended to include additional means by which a notary
can confirm the identity of an individual who resides in an assisted
living facility or nursing home.74 Given that many such residents
no longer travel or drive a car, a notary may now accept as proof
of their identity an expired U.S. passport book or card, an expired
foreign passport, an expired state driver’s license, or an expired
state identification card, provided in each case that the document
expired within five years of the time it is presented to the notary.75
L. Reports and Accounts of Certain Fiduciaries
All annual accounts and reports filed with the Commissioner of
Accounts on or after July 1, 2020, by a conservator, guardian of a
minor’s estate, committee, trustee for an incapacitated veteran, or

70. Act of Mar. 13, 2013, ch. 318, 2013 Va. Acts 537, 537 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-615, -633.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
71. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 974, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-633.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-14(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
73. See id. §§ 47.1-2, -14(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
74. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 902, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 47.1-2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
75. See id. at __.
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guardian of an incapacitated person must be signed under oath.76
If the fiduciary makes a false entry or statement in such a filing,
he or she will be subject to a fine of up to $500.77 Curiously, the
same oath requirement was not imposed on accountings filed by
personal representatives and testamentary trustees.78
M. Acceptance Policies and Disclosure of Charitable Gifts
Beginning July 1, 2020, each state college and university must
have a policy and process for reviewing, accepting, and documenting any terms and conditions associated with (1) gifts that direct
academic decision-making and (2) gifts of $1,000,000 or more that
impose a new obligation on the institution (other than gifts for
scholarships or other financial aid).79 Any such commitments, including the amount, date, purpose, and terms of the gift, must be
documented and made available to the public under the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act.80 The donor’s identity must also be
made public, unless he or she has requested anonymity and the
gift does not impose any terms or conditions directing academic
decision-making.81
N. Indexing of Wills
Henceforth, when an executor qualifies, the will is to be indexed
in the names of both the decedent and the qualifying executor(s).82
It is not clear how a will put to record without qualification will be
indexed. Similarly, all wills lodged for safekeeping in the clerk’s

76. Acts of Mar. 6 & 18, 2020, chs. 190 & 372, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-1305(D), -2020(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
77. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-1305(D), -2020(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
78. See id. §§ 64.2-1304, -1306 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
79. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 691, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 23.11304.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-1304.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020); Acts of Mar. 2, 2020, chs. 71 & 78,
2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.4(A)(7)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.4(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
82. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1063, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17.1-249(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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office by the testator must be indexed by both the name of the testator and “the executor then qualified.”83 Of course, there will be
no qualified executor until after the testator’s death, so it is not
known how clerks will carry out this directive. It is possible they
will index a will probated without qualification and a will lodged
for safekeeping by the names of the testator and the executor nominated in the will, if any.
O. Substitution of Bank Subsidiary as Trustee
Under current law, a Virginia subsidiary bank may be substituted in every fiduciary capacity for another bank that is under
common ownership by filing an application with the circuit court
in which its main office is located.84 The same procedure may now
be followed to substitute the subsidiary bank in place of a trust
subsidiary under common ownership.85 To qualify, at least 80% of
both the substituted bank and the bank or trust subsidiary must
be owned by the same Virginia bank holding company.86
The application may be made ex parte and must specify any fiduciary role that the applicant bank is not assuming.87 As with
substitutions under the current statute, the bank and the outgoing
trust subsidiary must file a joint account for the year of the substitution.88 Any designation of the trust subsidiary in a will or
other instrument will be deemed a designation of the substituted
bank unless the instrument expressly provides to the contrary.89
P. Duties of Child’s Guardian Ad Litem
Beginning July 1, 2020, the guardian ad litem of a child must
conduct an investigation in accordance with standards established

83. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1063, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-409(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1059(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
85. See Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 239, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 6.2-1047, -1059(A)–(C), (E)–(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1047 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
87. Id. § 6.2-1059(A), (C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
88. Id. § 6.2-1059(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
89. Id. § 6.2-1059(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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by the Judicial Council of Virginia and file a report before the
hearing with the court and parties, certifying compliance with
those standards, including the face-to-face contact requirement.90
Q. Ineligible Guardians and Conservators
Except for good cause shown, a court may not appoint any lawyer who has represented the petitioner in the past three years to
serve as guardian or conservator for an adult respondent.91 The
prohibition also extends to any other lawyer or employee of the law
firm with which the representing attorney is associated.92 However, an attorney is not disqualified from serving as guardian or
conservator solely because the petitioner has compensated the attorney or his or her firm for doing so.93 If the petitioner is a
healthcare facility, the court, for good cause, may order it to pay
the reasonable costs for the guardian or conservator while the respondent is under the care of the facility.94
R. Federal Income Tax Conformity
The 2020 General Assembly adjusted Virginia income tax law
to reflect additional changes made in the Internal Revenue Code
through December 31, 2019, except for the temporary reduction in
the threshold for deducting medical expenses from 10% to 7.5% of
adjusted gross income.95 An emergency clause applies these rules
to taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2018 and
makes it effective from February 17, 2020, the date the Governor
signed it.96

90. Act of Mar. 2, 2020, ch. 21, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1274(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
91. Act of Apr. 2, 2020, ch. 649, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-2007(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
92. Id. at __.
93. See id. at __.
94. Id. at __.
95. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534;
Acts of Feb. 17 & Mar. 10, 2020, chs. 1 & 255, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
96. See chs. 1 & 255, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __.
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II. CASES
A. Commissioner of Accounts’ Authority to Approve Final
Accounting
Henderson v. Cook considered, among other issues, whether a
circuit court may delegate to the Commissioner of Accounts its authority to approve or deny final accountings.97 The matter concerned a trust and conservatorship for an incapacitated adult.98
Following the conclusion of a suit for aid and guidance with respect
to the administration of the trust, the trustee/guardian, Ms. Cook,
asked the circuit court directly to approve her final accountings.99
The judge, perhaps anticipating imminent retirement, issued an
order pre-approving the accountings, subject to the Commissioner’s final review and approval.100 Ms. Henderson, a beneficiary, objected to the procedure because it bypassed the Commissioner’s initial review of the accountings.101 The Commissioner
approved the accounting, at which time the court order became final despite the beneficiary’s objections.102
Ms. Henderson appealed the lower court’s order, arguing, inter
alia, that the process used was incorrect as a matter of law and
that it deprived the beneficiaries of any meaningful opportunity
and due process to review and challenge the accountings.103 The
trustee argued in turn that the beneficiary’s objections had been
considered and rejected by the Commissioner and that any procedural error was harmless because it simply allowed the retiring
judge to conclude the matter without having to bring in a new
judge.104
Citing case law and the statute governing the role of Commissioners of Account (Virginia Code sections 64.2-1200 et seq.) for
the principle that the Commissioner’s work is subject to circuit
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

297 Va. 699, 702, 831 S.E.2d 717, 719 (2019).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 702–03, 703 n.1, 831 S.E.2d at 719 & n.1.
Id. at 702–03, 831 S.E.2d at 719.
Id. at 703, 831 S.E.2d at 720.
Id. at 704–05, 711, 831 S.E.2d at 720, 724.
Id. at 711, 831 S.E.2d at 724.
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court review and that proceedings should begin with the Commissioner and end with the court, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that the circuit court had improperly delegated the final approval of the accountings to the Commissioner.105 Because the order did not include a certification that the circuit court had made
a personal examination of the beneficiary’s exceptions as required
by law, the court’s erroneous delegation of its final approval to the
Commissioner was not harmless.106
B. Alternative Pleading Under Trust No-Contest Clause
Hunter v. Hunter is a notable case for Virginia practitioners.107
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s opinion expressly approves pleading in the alternative as a means for determining whether or not
a particular complaint will trigger a no-contest clause in a trust
agreement.108
The case involved a brother (Chip) and sister (Eleanor), both of
whom were beneficiaries of a trust created by their mother.109 Eleanor also served as co-trustee of the trust with her mother until
the latter’s death, at which time she became the sole trustee.110
After their mother’s death, Chip became alarmed when he learned
the value of the trust had declined by more than 50% at a time
when stocks in general had appreciated steadily.111 He asked his
sister to provide additional information about the trust’s activities,
which she refused to do, citing a trust provision that waived the
trustee’s statutory duties to inform and report under what is now
Virginia Code section 64.2-775.112
In an attempt to avoid triggering a no-contest clause, which defined “contest” as “any action seeking to invalidate, nullify, set
aside, render unenforceable, or otherwise avoid the effect of” any
provision of the agreement (in this case, the waiver language),
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 711–12, 831 S.E.2d at 724–25.
Id. at 712–13, 831 S.E.2d at 725 (citing VA. CODE § 64.2-1212(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
298 Va. 414, 838 S.E.2d 721 (2020).
See id. at 428–29, 838 S.E.2d at 727.
See id. at 419–20, 838 S.E.2d at 722.
See id. at 420, 838 S.E.2d at 722–23.
See id. at 420, 838 S.E.2d at 723.
See id. at 420, 420 n.1, 838 S.E.2d at 723, 723 n.1.
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Chip sought declaratory judgment in two steps.113 First, he asked
the court whether a beneficiary’s demand for an accounting notwithstanding the trust waiver would constitute a “contest” within
the meaning of the no-contest clause.114 Second, he asked, “if, and
only if” the answer to the first question was “no,” whether in fact
the waiver language relieved Eleanor of all statutory, common
law, and equitable obligations to inform and report.115 The trial
court agreed with Eleanor that this two-step pleading, when read
as a whole, was an attempt to require the trustee to provide an
accounting in violation of the trust waiver, and therefore it
amounted to a contest, which triggered the forfeiture clause.116
On appeal, Chip argued that he had sought merely to construe
his mother’s trust, not to contest it.117 He maintained that the trial
court had ignored his request to interpret the waiver language
only if it first concluded that such a request would not constitute
a contest that would cause him to forfeit his trust interest.118 The
supreme court agreed, reversing the lower court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings.119 In so doing, it expressly approved the alternative-pleading model whereby a trust
beneficiary may seek a declaratory judgment to interpret a no-contest clause in the instrument without putting the beneficiary’s interest directly at risk.120
Attorneys should note, however, that the supreme court specifically remarked that trusts differed from wills in that the former
depended upon a fiduciary relationship between trustee and beneficiary that required at least some degree of oversight.121 This
suggests that the court’s analysis might not be the same if a similar “two-step” pleading model were employed in a will contest.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 420–21, 431, 838 S.E.2d at 723, 729.
See id. at 421, 838 S.E.2d at 723.
See id.
See id. at 422, 426, 838 S.E.2d at 724, 726.
See id. at 426, 838 S.E.2d at 726.
See id. at 426–27, 838 S.E.2d at 726.
Id. at 436–37, 838 S.E.2d at 732.
Id. at 428–29, 838 S.E.2d at 727.
See id. at 425, 838 S.E.2d at 725.
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C. Required Elements of a Gift
Under Virginia law, an inter vivos gift requires both (1) donative
intent at the time of the gift and (2) such actual or constructive
delivery as divests the donor of all dominion and control over the
property and invests it in the donee.122 Knop v. Knop serves as a
reminder that donative intent without delivery is insufficient to
complete a gift.123
Knop involved a majority owner of a closely-held corporation,
who had previously given each of his three children 9.08% of the
outstanding shares in the company.124 These gifted shares were
evidenced by certificates and recorded in the company’s stock
book.125 By all accounts, the father later gave (or rather, intended
to give) each child another 5.6% of stock.126 However, while the
parties gave these additional gifts effect for federal and state tax
purposes and otherwise acknowledged them in various internal
documents, the company’s stock ledger was never updated and no
new stock certificates were ever issued to the shareholders.127
After a disagreement arose over certain corporate actions, the
father took steps to regain control over the corporation by asserting that the second round of gifts were never completed because
no stock certificates were ever delivered to the children.128 The
trial court agreed.129
On the children’s appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted
that delivery of certificated shares occurs only when the donee (or
the donee’s designee) acquires possession of the certificate, regardless of the donor’s intent.130 The court rejected the children’s argument that the company’s tax returns and other records should be
122. Knop v. Knop, 297 Va. 553, 559, 830 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2019).
123. Id. at 560, 830 S.E.2d at 726.
124. See id. at 556, 830 S.E.2d at 724.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 556–57, 830 S.E.2d at 724–25. Although not specifically stated by the
court, 5.6% is the difference between the 14.68% total claimed by the children and the 9.08%
acknowledged by the father. See id.
127. See id. at 557, 830 S.E.2d at 725.
128. See id. at 558, 830 S.E.2d at 725.
129. See id. at 558–59, 830 S.E.2d at 725–26.
130. Id. at 560, 830 S.E.2d at 726.
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taken as conclusive evidence of constructive delivery.131 It agreed
that a gift could be completed via constructive delivery, but only
where the donor has surrendered dominion and control over the
property.132 Statements on tax returns, while made under penalty
of perjury, do not constitute a relinquishment of control.133
The children also argued that their father should be estopped
from denying their increased ownership, but they failed to offer
evidence of any detriment suffered as a result of his actions.134
Without such evidence, the supreme court could not act.135
Lastly, the children attempted to invoke the doctrine of “quasiestoppel,” which could have allowed them to prevail without a
showing of specific detrimental reliance.136 Declaring quasi-estoppel an “amorphous, nebulous theory” not recognized by Virginia
law, the supreme court flatly rejected the argument without discussion and affirmed the trial court’s ruling.137
D. Power to Make Gifts Under Durable Power of Attorney
Davis v. Davis considered the extent to which a durable general
power of attorney authorized the named agent to make gifts of the
principal’s property.138 It concerned a decedent, Mr. Davis, who
gave his mother a durable general power of attorney that, among
other things, authorized her to “sell and convey any and all” of his
property and to “perform all and every act . . . [he] might or could
do if acting personally.”139 However, the instrument did not specifically authorize her to make gifts.140

131. See id. at 563, 830 S.E.2d at 728.
132. See id. at 561–62, 830 S.E.2d at 727–28.
133. See id. at 562, 830 S.E.2d at 728.
134. See id. at 563–64, 830 S.E.2d at 728.
135. Id. at 564, 830 S.E.2d at 729. It appears to the authors that the court might have
reached a different result had the children offered their tax returns into evidence to show
any additional taxes they may have paid over the years with respect to the shares. See id.
at 563–64, 830 S.E.2d at 728–29.
136. Id. at 564–65, 830 S.E.2d at 729.
137. Id. at 565, 830 S.E.2d at 729.
138. 298 Va. 157, 162, 835 S.E.2d 888, 889 (2019).
139. See id. at 163, 835 S.E.2d at 889.
140. Cf. id.
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Many years later, following a decline in her son’s health and his
secret marriage in the hospital to a long-time caregiver, Mr. Davis’s then elderly mother used the power to transfer nearly all of
his personal property to herself and all of his real property to her
other children.141 She claimed she did it to protect the property for
her son’s benefit until he recovered his health.142 Although Mr. Davis’s mother knew her son had made a will several years earlier,
the lower court found she did not know its contents (which provided for part of his estate to be distributed to other beneficiaries).143
Following the executor’s request for aid and guidance, the circuit court held that the gifts were valid on the grounds that the
agent’s power to “sell and convey” Mr. Davis’s property included
the authority to give it away.144 It also found that, in accordance
with Virginia Code section 64.2-1622(H), the instrument’s “do all
acts” clause authorized the agent to make gifts in accordance with
the principal’s donative history, without regard to the annual exclusion limit under Virginia Code section 64.2-1638(B)(1).145 The
circuit court found that Mr. Davis’s personal history of lifetime
gifts included a long-term lease of real property to a family friend
for $1000, permission to pledge that property as collateral for a
loan for lessee improvements, and a $10,000 gift to his brother.146
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court.147 Applying principles of strict construction, it first found that the power
to “sell and convey” contained in the document must be read in the
conjunctive, and therefore the mother had no express power to
“convey” her son’s property except as part of a sale.148 In dicta, the
court further concluded that even if there were an express gifting
power, it would have been limited to the annual exclusion amount
by Virginia Code section 64.2-1638(B)(1).149
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 164, 835 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 165, 835 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 163–66, 835 S.E.2d at 890–91.
Id. at 164, 166, 835 S.E.2d at 890–91.
See id. at 166, 835 S.E.2d at 891.
Id. at 165–66, 835 S.E.2d at 890–91.
Id. at 176, 835 S.E.2d at 897.
Id. at 168–71, 835 S.E.2d at 892–94.
Id. at 171, 835 S.E.2d at 894.
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The supreme court then rejected the idea that the gifts were
valid under the “do all acts” clause, finding that they far exceeded
Mr. Davis’s personal history of making gifts.150 It is perhaps interesting to note that the court also suggested that, even if the gifts
had been in accordance with the principal’s past giving history,
they would have still been found invalid because, in the court’s
view, the power of attorney only authorized all acts that pertained
to Mr. Davis’s financial and business affairs, not “all acts” in general, and therefore there was no implied power to make gifts.151
E. Will Interpretation
In Larsen v. Stack, the Supreme Court of Virginia was called
upon to review the trial court’s interpretation of a will provision
which devised the decedent’s house and farm to his two children,
subject to his wife’s right to “reside in our home . . . for so long as
she is physically and mentally able to do so . . . .”152 Although no
specific words are needed to create a life estate, the supreme court
reaffirmed the rule that the intention to create one must be plainly
manifested in the will.153
In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court agreed with the
lower court that the language of the decedent’s will was ambiguous, and therefore that the drafting attorney’s testimony regarding intent was admissible.154 The attorney in turn testified that his
client did not intend to give the wife a life estate in the house and
farm because he was afraid it could interfere with her possible
qualification for Medicaid, and therefore he wanted her interest to
end if she went into a nursing home.155 The supreme court also
found it relevant that (1) the widow’s rights ended when she was
no longer physically or mentally able to live on the property, rather
than at her death; (2) another provision of the will had expressly
granted her a “life estate” in a different piece of property, yet the
decedent chose not to use the same language when disposing of the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id. at 175–76, 835 S.E.2d at 896–97.
Id. at 172, 835 S.E.2d at 894 n.4.
__ Va. __, __, 842 S.E.2d 372, 373 (2020).
See id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 375.
See id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 376–77.
See id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 374.
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house and farm; and (3) the widow was given the right to certain
rental payments earned from a cell tower located on the farm,
which would not have been necessary had she been given a life
estate.156
Additionally, because the decedent did not give his wife a life
estate, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that
the children were the fee simple owners of the property and, as
such, had the concurrent right to access and use the property in
any manner that did not interfere with the widow’s rights.157
CONCLUSION
Again this year the General Assembly refrained from making
major changes in Virginia trust and estate law, but it provided
helpful guidance to practitioners dealing with directed trusts, confronting the need to partition real estate, facing fiduciary issues,
planning for disabled individuals, and encountering other issues
of everyday practice.
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Henderson highlighted problems inherent in procedural shortcuts, even those taken in the
name of judicial efficiency. Its Hunter decision provided a roadmap
for plaintiffs seeking to avoid triggering a no-contest clause in a
trust. Its Knop decision emphasized the role of delivery in completing a gift and rejected the idea of a quasi-estoppel doctrine in Virginia law. Davis and Larsen showed the importance of examining
the actual wording of a document in light of the factual context.

156.
157.

See id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 375.
See id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 376.

